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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, throughout a standard Public Choice model for the demand of 
public goods, we intend to analyze the public expenditures in Turkey. In 
doing so, we employ a panel approach to test the median voter theorem at 
provincial level, over the period 1995-2001. To estimate the parameters in 
the model with panel data, we use fixed effect estimation specification with 
least squares method (LS). In addition, to compare the results and justify the 
reliability of our estimates, we also employ the generalization method of 
moments (GMM). For a further look, we also advance our study at regional 
level. Our findings strongly support the theoretical model. Furthermore, our 
investigation at the regional level suggests sharp differences across the 
regions. 
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TÜRKİYE’DEKİ KAMU HARCAMALARININ ORTANCA 
SEÇMEN TEOREMİ KULLANILARAK ANALİZİ 
ÖZET  
Bu çalışmada Türkiye’deki kamu harcamaları, kamu malı talebi için kullanılan 
standart Kamusal Tercihler modeli aracılığıyla ortanca seçmen teoremi 
kullanılarak il bazında, 1995-2001 yılları için panel veri yaklaşımıyla test 
edilmiştir. Panel veri yaklaşımı kullanılırken en küçük kareler yöntemi ile sabit 
etki tahmini yapılmıştır. Ayrıca, sonuçların güvenilirliğinden emin olmak ve 
karşılaştırmalı bir gerçekleme yapmak amacıyla genelleştirilmiş momentler 
yöntemi kullanılmıştır. Çalışma bir adım daha ileriye götürülerek, bölgesel 
seviyede de yenilenmiştir. Bulgular teorik modeli güçlü bir biçimde 
desteklemektedir. Ayrıca, bölgesel düzeydeki analizler, bölgeler arasındaki 
çarpıcı farkı da ortaya koymaktadır.  
Anahtar Sözcükler: Ortanca Seçmen Teoremi, Kamu Harcamaları, Kamusal 
Tercihler Modeli 
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INTRODUCTION 
Analysis of public expenditures constitutes a central issue in the 
public economics and public finance literature. Considering the public 
expenditures in the form of publicly supplied goods and services, a series 
of issues has been addressed. Basically, the cost of those goods and 
services is provided by the community, and the demand of those goods 
and services decided collectively (Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973). 
Although those issues refer to problematical matters, having information 
about the public good demand of the individuals, hence the community’s, 
may be useful in many context. For instance, it may be convenient to 
estimate the possible effects of demographic and economic changes on 
the public goods to be provided. Or it may be useful to get information 
about the degree of publicness of the provided goods, in order to ensure 
efficiency. 
In this paper, throughout a standard Public Choice model for the 
demand of public goods based on median voter theorem, we intend to 
analyze the public expenditures in Turkey. In doing so, we employ a 
panel approach to test the median voter theorem at provincial level over 
the period 1995-2001. Although such a study at cross-sectional level was 
conducted by Pınar (2001), the writer investigates local government 
(municipalities) expenditures. However, considering the dominance of 
central government rather than local governments in Turkey, we employ 
the expenditures executed through consolidated budget. 
To estimate the parameters in the model through panel data, we 
use fixed effect estimation specification with least squares method (LS). 
In addition to compare the results and justify the reliability of our 
estimates, we also employ generalization method of moments (GMM). 
For a further look, we also advance our study at regional level. Our 
findings strongly support the theoretical model. Furthermore, our 
investigation at the regional level suggests sharp differences across 
regions. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: While the first 
section briefly summarizes the theoretical background, the second 
section exhibits the model. In the third section we introduce the data and 
in the fourth, we deal with the estimations and their results. Finally, the 
fifth section consists of concluding remarks. 
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THE SIGNIFICANCE AND THE EMPIRICS OF THE MEDIAN VOTER 
THEOREM 
The expenditures of private goods are determined in markets 
through price mechanisms. However, expenditures on public goods are 
non-market issues and determined through a political process. One of the 
disciplines exclusively dealing with this issue is the Public Choice Theory, 
which can be defined as “the economic study of non-market decision-
making or, simply the application of economics to political science” 
(Mueller, 1976: 395). 
In public choice theory, it is assumed that decision-making in a 
political process is executed through a political-exchange, called 
catallaxy, within the parties of this process. As in exchange in the market 
between sellers and buyers for private goods, for public goods there 
exists also a political exchange for the provision. According to Buchanan 
(1985), politics can be considered as an institution for exchange, like 
markets. Throughout political exchange individuals of a community try to 
execute their objectives which they cannot execute efficiently without 
any collective action. As he mentioned clearly, through political 
exchange, individuals decide their demand for their collective needs, such 
as justice, security, education, etc., and their contribution for the 
provision of these publicly provided goods. 
In this context, the median voter model appears as a useful tool 
for the Public Choice Theory. It is useful to provide a formal explanation 
for the expenditure level on public goods. Based on the model, median 
voter theorem suggests that, if the individuals in a community are ranked 
according to their most preferred levels of public good expenditure, the 
most preferred level of the individual at the median will emerge as the 
determinant, in case of a referendum based on majority voting (Rosen, 
1999). In other words, outcome of a majority voting procedure in a 
community will reflect the preferences of the median voter.  
However, the validity of the median voter theorem requires an 
assumption of single peaked preferences. As long as the single peakness 
assumption is violated, result of the majority voting becomes unstable. 
Certain restrictions may be applied for this problem. For instance, when 
we restrict choices for a level of single public good the result usually 
indicate single-peaked preferences (Kramer, 1973).  On the other hand, 
restrictions for one issue at each time may also ensure the single-peaked 
preferences (Slutsky, 1975). Furthermore, under some assumptions the 
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theorem has been proofed in multi-dimensional cases (Mueller, 2003: 67-
72). 
Although median voter model has some imperfections, it provides 
a useful framework for the empirical studies which aim to investigate the 
demand of public goods. In most of these empirical studies, the demand 
of public goods can be computed by examining how the quantity of 
public goods depends on the relative price per unit of public good, and 
the median voter’s income. 
Earlier studies by Borcherding and Deacon (1972) and Bergstrom 
and Goodman (1973) represent a very useful framework for both 
theoretical and empirical examination of local public spending. Both 
studies are based on demand analysis of local public goods throughout 
estimating the median voter’s (identified by median income) demand for 
the public good. In both studies, the median voter assumed to maximize 
their utility by consuming private and public goods under the constraint 
of their budget. In both studies the empirical results suggest significant 
and expected empirical evidences.1 
Some of the studies focus on the relevance of the median voter 
model. One of those refined studies belongs to Holcombe (1989). 
Holcombe’s thesis is that, the median voter model can be used as a 
foundation to understand the public sector demand, like the pure 
competition in private sector. And, according to the writer, the 
fundamental model can be extended through various complications, such 
as multi-peaked preferences. After reviewing strong arguments both 
empirically and theoretically, Holcombe suggests that median voter 
theorem is a good approximation of demand aggregation in the public 
sector for various issues. 
On the other hand, Mueller (2003) emphasizes on comparative 
empirical tests for the median voter model. The writer argues that 
empirical tests should be based on some comparison of performance of 
spending models with mean and median variables, such as income and 
tax share. Pommerehne and Frey (1976) and Pommerehne (1978) can be 
cited as the major empirical works to compare the performances of the 
models with mean and median variables. While the study by 
Pommerehne and Frey (1976) provides empirical evidences on behalf of 
the spending models with median variables, Pommerehne (1978) gives 
further information that suggests median income performs well in direct 
                                                          
 
1 In both empirical studies (Borcherding and Deacon, 1972; Bergstrom and Goodman, 
1973) income elasticity is positive and significant; price elasticity is negative and 
significant, which respect to the median voter theorem. 
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democracy governments, but in a representative government it does not 
sustain a distinguished performance against the models with mean 
income variables. 
THE MODEL 
For a pure public good, the median voter’s problem can be written 
as; 
)Q,y(UUmax
Q,y
=      (1) 
subject to 
QpypI Qym τ+=    
where y , q , yp and Qp are defined as quantity of private good, 
quantity of public good and their prices, respectively. τ  and mI  
represent tax share and income of median voter, respectively. Also, Q  
implies the total provision of public good.  
The first order conditions associated with the above maximization 
problem suggest the following demand function for the public good 
)I,p,p(QQ mQy τ=      (2) 
The demand function in equation (2) refers to the demand of a 
pure public good.2 However, certain public goods may be partially rival; 
for this intermediate case we barrow a device from Borcherding and 
Deacon (1972: 893) which implies to the level of public good available for 
consumption,   
αN/Q*Q =       (3) 
where 10 ≤≤ α , and N  represents population. Note that in 
extreme cases, when 0=α  and 1=α  the good is purely public and 
private, respectively. In intermediate cases, the good exhibits impure 
characteristic, in terms of its rivalness in consumption. 
Equation (3) allows us to find a price for an ordinary demand 
function for *Q  as ατ NpQ , which indicates price of public goods 
                                                          
 
2 Pure public goods are the goods neither rival nor excludable in consumption. Non-rivalry 
in consumption refers to cases for which one person’s consumption does not reduce or 
prevent another person’s consumption. Non-excludability, implies that it is either or 
prohibitively costly to exclude any individual from the benefits of the public good. 
Emin Köksal 
 
 
216 
available for consumption. Then, the demand function for *Q  can be 
written as 
),,(** mQy INppQQ ατ=     (4) 
By assuming a constant elasticity demand function, borrowing from 
Bergstrom and Goodman (1973), one can derive the demand function for 
*Q  as; 
φηδατ ymQ pINpcQ )(* =     (5) 
And, substituting equation (5) in equation (3) gives us the total 
level of purchased Q  as 
 
λφηδτ NpIpcQ ymQ )(=      (6) 
where )1( δαλ += . 
In logarithmic form equation (6) becomes 
NpIpcQ ymQ lnlnln)ln(ln λφητδ ++++=  (7) 
The above equation is very helpful in our context in many ways. 
First of all, the estimation of the coefficients (with the addition of an error 
term) gives us the elasticity measures of each variable. The price 
elasticity of demand (δ ), income elasticity of demand (η ), and elasticity 
of private good prices (φ ) can be identified. Moreover, it has to be 
emphasized that increase in population will influence the public 
expenditure through tax share and degree of publicness. More clearly, 
recalling )1( δαλ +=  where α  is the rivalry parameter, as the 
population increases tax share will decrease at a magnitude depending 
on the rivalry of the public expenditures. 
Although equation (7) exhibits a useful characteristic for an 
empirical estimation, the price elasticity has been masked by the effects 
of tax share (τ ). Since τ  represents the median voter’s share of the 
cost of one unit of public good, empirically measuring τ  refers to a 
problematic issue. Thus, we follow Dudley and Montarquette (1981) and 
assume an equal cost sharing among the population, which implies 
N/1=τ        (8) 
Then, substituting equation (8) in equation (7), transforms the 
equation into form as; 
NlnplnIlnplncQln ymQ θφηδ ++++=   (9) 
where  
δδαθ −+= )1( .  
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Thus, equation (9) becomes practical to serve us as a model to 
estimate, with the addition of an error term. This econometric 
specification will serve us as the first model to estimate the important 
determinants of public expenditure. 
DATA 
In most of the seminal papers (Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973; 
Borcherding and Deacon, 1972; Dudley and Montarquette, 1981) and in 
the Turkey-specific study (Pınar, 2001), the median voter demand 
functions were estimated through cross-sectional data. Conversely, we 
used panel data with 79 provinces3 over the seven year period of 1995-
2001. The most obvious conveniences of this approach, which distinguish 
it from the cross-sectionals, may be interpreted in two ways. First, it 
provides a larger number of observations through adding the time 
dimension. Second, we obtain both inter-province and intra-province 
variations for all variables. 
The data used in this paper has been collected from three official 
resources: Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT), Central Bank of 
Republic of Turkey (CBRT) and General Directorate of Public Accounts 
(GDPA). From those data sources, we sought the required data with an 
annual period for each 79 provinces in Turkey, to create a balanced panel 
data set. Although we would have liked to estimate with a larger number 
of observations, we have been restricted by the lack of time-series 
regional statistics in many variables. Thus, we had to restrict our study 
with a period of seven years, 1995-2001. In other words, our number of 
observation has restricted us with 553 observations. In many contexts, 
this observation number may be acceptable. 
To empirically measure the dependent variable, quantity of public 
good (Q ), we use consolidated budget expenditures for each province 
deflated by public sector price deflator (1994=100). The consolidated 
budget consists of both general and annexed budgets. By definition, 
while an institution which is financed by general budget provides pure 
public goods, and institutions with annexed budgets provide semi or 
impure public goods, such as education. Although the consolidated 
budget has ignored the special budgets for local authorities, such as 
municipalities, as Pınar (2001) suggested, local authorities prefer relying 
                                                          
 
3 We exclude the provinces, Duzce and Osmaniye, because of missing data for earlier years 
of the period. 
Emin Köksal 
 
 
218 
on central government rather than local revenue sources as a way of tax 
related political risks. Facing with this Turkey-specific reality, we argued 
that expenditures financed by consolidated budget may be a better 
measure for the quantity of public good. 
On the other hand, none of the data sources provide the identity 
of the voter with median preferences for the public good; hence, their 
income ( mI ) is not known. In earlier studies, e.g. Bergstrom and 
Goodman (1973), have argued that there would be some possible 
systematic errors for particular choices of proxies for the median voter’s 
income. However, following Murdoch, Sandler and Hansen (1991: 627), 
we argue that for each province we can place a proxy variable that is 
highly correlated with the income of the median voter, in a panel data 
which consists partially by time series data. The most conventional one 
may be the mean income, based on the results suggested by 
Pommerehne (1978)4. Hence, we use GDP per person. We prefer GDP 
per person in current prices for each province, in order to capture more 
the price related issues.5 
For the unit prices of public ( Qp ) and composite private goods (
yp ), we use public sector price index (1994=100) and consumer price 
index (1994=100), respectively. While the former is unique for each year 
for all provinces, the latter variable is available for some provinces and 
for all geographical regions. For public goods, it can be reasonable to 
assume that most of the supplies purchased by provinces are subject to 
the national market. There is no objection to use a unique indicator for 
each region. For instance, considering the salaries for officials, they are 
all the same across countries, excluding some side payments. However, 
we cannot argue the same thing for private goods, since local factor 
prices are more influential on private goods. 
The data for the population consists of mid-year population 
estimations, which are calculated based on two consecutive census’ 
definite results for each province. The complete list of variables is 
displayed in Appendix 1. 
                                                          
 
4 As mentioned above, Pommerehne (1978) suggested that median income performs well in 
direct democracy governments, but in a representative government it does not sustain a 
distinguished performance against the models with mean income variables. 
5 Current GDP is preferred because prices in equation (9) later will be represented by price 
indexes (public sector and consumer price indexes) which are closely related with the 
deflator used for real GDP.   
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ESTIMATION AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this section, the model outlined in section 3 will be estimated 
with two alternative methods, least squares (LS) and generalized method 
of moments (GMM), throughout our panel data. Existence of alternative 
estimation method aims to compare and justify the reliability of our 
estimation. 
However, before starting the estimations, checking for the 
muticollinearity problem gives us high pair-wise correlations among some 
regressors. The indexes chosen for the unit price of composite private 
good and public good suggest high correlations with each other and with 
GDP per person, which refers to a proxy of median voter’s income.6 
In order to construct a reliable econometric specification, this 
problem forces us to drop at least one of the price index variables from 
the model. Considering the price of public good as an essential element 
of the model, we drop the index used for price of private goods. At first 
sight, this action can be seen as a specification bias which implies 
incorrect specification of the theoretical model. However, as soon as we 
assume that public goods are not substitutable with private goods, we 
can manage the problem. In fact, most of the goods and services, which 
are provided publicly, have not any private alternative. Then our 
econometric specification will not refer to any specification bias against 
the theoretical model. 
Another important issue, which will shape our specification, comes 
from the AR process. Both our doubt and test showed that the 
dependent variable has an AR(1) process. Considering the budget 
principal, which implies appropriation of annual allowances and 
cancellation of unexpended appropriations, AR(1) process may be 
legitimated in reality. 
Thus the main econometric specification to estimate appears as;              
t
i
1t
i
t
i
t
im
t
iQ
t
i uQlnNlnIlnplncQln +++++= −θηδ , (10) 
where subscripts show the cross-sections and superscripts imply time 
series. 
Our main intention is to discover that our estimates of income 
elasticity are significant and positive, and the estimates of price elasticity 
are significant and negative. Although the estimates of population 
elasticity are related with price elasticity parameter and the crowding 
                                                          
 
6 See Appendix 2. 
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parameter,7 its expected sign must be positive. Considering the earlier 
studies and assuming that all public goods are not pure then, this 
expectation can be legitimized. 
In estimation with LS method, we use fixed effects specification to 
exploit the richness of the data. Through using fixed effect specification, 
each cross-sectional unit, here each province has its own intercept value. 
Thus, by controlling effectively the cross-section effects, we can deal 
more with the variable of interests. The results are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1: Fixed Effect Estimation with LS 
Estimated parameter Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic 
Price elasticity -0.52*** 0.04 -12.42 
Population elasticity 0.55*** 0.06 9.75 
Income elasticity 0.51*** 0.05 10.67 
Elas. of preceding level  0.54*** 0.06 9.40 
R-squared: 0.99            Durbin-Watson stat: 2.11               Number of obs: 474 
 
Before interpreting the results some econometric issues must be 
mentioned about the estimation. First, the results are cross-sectional 
weighted GLS estimates, to allow heteroscedasticity in a relevant 
dimension. Second, to attain robust standard errors we employ White’s 
heteroscedasticity–correction. 
The results are completely consistent with the theoretical model, in 
terms of their significances and their signs. In earlier studies, i.e., 
Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) and Borcherding and Deacon (1972), it 
is reported that income elasticities are less than one and price elasticities 
in the range of -0.2 to -0.6. Our results are robust and remain in the 
mentioned intervals. 
However, as mentioned earlier, population elasticity consists of 
price elasticity parameter and the crowding parameter. Considering the 
estimated measures in Table 1, one can calculate the crowding 
parameter as 0.07, approximately. This refers to the characteristic of the 
public goods with a high degree of publicness. In other words, the 
provided goods are almost non-rival, or pure. 
The confirmation of theory across the country motivates us to 
make some additional tests at regional level. In fact, we were curious 
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about the behavior of the model with different subgroups. Accordingly, 
we divide the country into three zones, taking into account the level of 
GDP per person. Accordingly, the first zone consists of the regions 
Marmara and Aegean (MAR-AEG). The second zone consists of Central 
Anatolia, Black Sea and Mediterranean (CEN-BLS-MED). And the third 
zone consists of East and South East Anatolia (EAS-SEA). 
Table 2: Fixed Effects Estimation with LS for zones 
MAR-AEG 
Estimated parameter Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic 
Price elasticity -0.59*** 0.07 -8.18 
Population elasticity 0.93** 0.37 2.56 
Income elasticity 0.58*** 0.08 6.92 
Elas. of preceding level  0.54*** 0.09 5.97 
R-squared: 0.98            Durbin-Watson stat: 2.12                     Number of obs: 114 
CEN-BLS-MED 
Estimated parameter Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic 
Price elasticity -0.51*** 0.03 -14.78 
Population elasticity 0.60*** 0.08 7.80 
Income elasticity 0.52*** 0.04 12.53 
Elas. of preceding level  0.46*** 0.05 9.67 
R-squared: 0.99               Durbin-Watson stat: 2.18                  Number of obs: 210 
EAS-SEA 
Estimated parameter Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic 
Price elasticity -0.56*** 0.05 -11.09 
Population elasticity 0.44*** 0.08 5.48 
Income elasticity 0.53*** 0.06 9.24 
Elas. of preceding level  0.58*** 0.07 7.74 
R-squared: 0.98              Durbin-Watson stat: 1.98                   Number of obs: 150 
We use the same specification and the same techniques to avoid 
usual problems, as mentioned in the previous test. The results are 
exhibited in Table 2, for each zone. 
At first sight, the elasticity measures do not exhibit a derogative 
view, in terms of their signs and significances. However, a further 
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investigation helps us to state the differences. First, while the income 
elasticity for EAS-SEA and CEN-BLS-MED follow the same pattern for the 
general test across the country, the income elasticity for MAR-AEG is 
significantly greater than the other estimates. Second, the same pattern 
can be observed for the price elasticities; again the elasticity for MAR-
AEG is greater than the other estimates. 
More interestingly, the elasticity of population is the most variant 
in both estimations. Particularly, extreme values are obtained for MAR-
AEG and EAS-SEA districts, 0.93 and 0.43, respectively. Those extreme 
values also suggest other extreme values for the crowding parameter. 
The calculations give us the crowding parameters as 0.84 for MAR-AEG 
and -0.28 for EAS-SEA.8 
The parameter for MAR-AEG can be interpreted through 
considering the demographic situation in the zone. Since the population 
concentration is relatively high in the district, it may be argued that as 
the population increases the rivalness degree of the provided good 
increases. Alternatively, as Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) argued, 
there appear to be no economies of scale to larger provinces in the 
provision of the public good. 
However, the estimated parameter for EAS-SEA, is quite 
interesting and perhaps, it has to be evaluated as economically 
nonsense. An alternative interpretation can concern the externalities 
issue, because of non-rival and non excludable characteristic of public 
goods. But details of this interpretation may go beyond the frontiers of 
this paper. However, it must be noted that the crowding parameter 
increases as the city sizes increase; at least in the sample for this study. 
Finally, in order to show the robustness and consistency of the 
estimated coefficient by LS method, we employ the GMM method. In 
fact, GMM for a panel data may be a useful tool for our data, with large 
number of cross-sections and short time series. 
For the GMM estimation we use the same econometric 
specification defined in equation (10). As in the estimation with LS 
method, we use fixed effects specification. Also, for the 
heteroscedasticity case, cross-sectional weighted GLS and White’s 
heteroscedasticity–correction are employed. In addition, instruments list 
for the GMM estimation, which consists of lag values of regressors, is 
arranged. The results are shown in Table 3. 
                                                          
 
8 The crowding parameter for CEN-BLS-MED can be calculated as 0.19. 
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Table 3: Fixed Effects Estimation with GMM 
Estimated parameter Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic 
Price elasticity -0.44*** 0.08 -5.35 
Population elasticity 0.48*** 0.03 14.35 
Income elasticity 0.41*** 0.10 4.26 
Elas. of preceding level  0.61*** 0.12 4.97 
R-squared: 0.99             Durbin-Watson stat: 2.08                 Number of obs: 395 
 
At first sight, the significance and the signs of the coefficients 
completely confirm the results that we obtained through LS. However, 
the value of the coefficients has decreased almost 20 percent, except the 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable. Calculations of the 
estimated crowding parameter also give similar value as the LS, 0.77. 
Although GMM provides a useful framework for the comparison of 
the common estimators, it is a large sample estimator. As we are aware 
of this phenomenon, we do not try to compare the estimated values of 
the coefficients from the test on zones. In panel data, as the number of 
cross-sections, hence the number of observations decreases, the 
efficiency of the GMM estimators also decreases. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper we have employed the median voter model of Public 
Choice Theory as a tool to analyze the government expenditures in 
Turkey across the provinces. We have tested the model using fixed effect 
estimation both at country and region level through LS method. Also a 
comparison for the validity of the estimated parameters has been 
checked with an alternative estimation method, GMM. Both estimation 
results suggest strong evidences for the confirmation of the theoretical 
model across the country within the mentioned period. 
Income elasticity is positive and significant as expected, in all 
estimations. The estimates remain the values that are reported in other 
empirical studies. However, the estimation at the regional level gives us 
some clues, which suggest that income elasticity is decreasing gradually 
throughout west to east. This evidence may be interpreted in many 
ways. For instance, one may argue that urbanization plays a major role 
for the income elasticity. Thus, it would be interesting to measure the 
effect of urbanization. But, we have not encountered a suitable standard 
source of data to test this phenomenon for our sample. Another 
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argument may be on the grounds of politics, but we would not like to 
make speculations in the limited scope of this paper. 
Population elasticity and price elasticity may be elaborated 
commonly, since their estimated values define the crowding parameter. 
As expected, the price elasticity is negative. That means public good is a 
normal good. The population elasticity is positive, which is consistent 
with the theory. However, while the price elasticity has not varied across 
regions, the population elasticity, hence the crowding parameter, are 
terribly different. This dispersion should be interpreted carefully, since we 
have a strong assumption which implies equal tax share among the 
population ( N/1=τ ). However, one can argue that in eastern regions, 
by interpreting the negative value of crowding parameters as close to 
zero, there should be large economies of scale in terms of benefits of 
publicly provided goods. 
Finally, there are some comments about this work that we wish to 
address here. First of all, it may be argued that time series that we have 
used might not be long enough to analyze the dynamic effects for the 
elasticities. Although our balanced panel fit the model better than the 
cross-sectional one, more time series may increase the reliability of the 
model. Secondly, throughout the study, our analysis ignores the political 
considerations about the public expenditures; but as mentioned earlier, 
this sort of discussion is further than the scope of this paper. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Variables in the Model 
Dependent variable 
Qi: Consolidated budget expenditure for the ith province, with the prices of 1994 
Independent variables  
PQi: deflator for public sector (1994=100) 
Imi: per capita GDP for the ith province, in current prices 
Pyi: consumer price index for ith province (1994=100) 
Ni: population of the ith provinces 
Appendix 2: Correlation Matrix of Regressors 
  lnQ lnIm lnpy lnpQ lnN 
lnQ  1.000000         
lnIm  0.226009  1.000000       
lnpy  0.097289  0.913458  1.000000     
lnpQ  0.084887  0.803364  0.997743  1.000000   
lnN  0.897784  0.152925  0.030702  0.021788  1.000000 
 
 
